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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article provides an update of judicial and legislative develop-
ments of franchise law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit during the
Survey period. Relevant case law and legislative efforts from
around the country regarding Federal Trade Commission rules, decisions,
and prosecutions that impact franchise businesses are also included.
II. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
A franchise relationship consists of three elements: (1) a significant as-
sociation between the franchisee's business and the franchisor's trade-
marks; (2) payment of a franchise fee; and (3) the franchisor's right to
exercise significant control over, or provide significant assistance to, the
franchisee in the operation of its business.'
A. ENCROACHMENT/GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A franchisor's approval of a new franchisee located sufficiently close to
an existing franchise as to draw business away from the existing franchise
is often termed an "encroachment."'2 Another form of encroachment
may be claimed when a corporation owns multiple brands that compete
against each other. When two or more of these brands operate in the
1. Several attempts have been made in recent years to apply franchise laws to distrib-
utorships. For the most part, distributorships have been considered to be outside the scope
of franchise laws. But in Gentis v. Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 129 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998), a California appellate court concluded that a manufacturer of
record-keeping systems and office products was a franchisor and that its distributors were
franchisees. The court used the California Franchise Investment Law definition of a
franchise, focusing specifically on the words "offer" and "distribute" to determine that the
distributors did offer goods for sale. See id. at 126-27. The court's apparent expansion of
the franchise definition is tempered, because neither party disputed the trial court's finding
that the distributors operated under a marketing plan prescribed in substantial part by the
manufacturer, that the operation of the business pursuant to that system was substantially
associated with the manufacturer's trademark, and that the manufacturer was required to
pay a franchise fee.
2. For a thorough discussion of encroachment, see Deborah S. Coldwell & John F.
Dienelt, Gerrymandering: When is Expansion Encroachment? Business, Law & System
Politics in the Encroachment Debate, (Oct. 16-18, 1996) (unpublished ABA Annual Pro-
gram, "Franchise Elections," Vol. 2) (on file with author).
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same vicinity, a dissatisfied franchisee may attempt to assert an encroach-
ment claim.
Although franchise encroachment cases often include allegations of a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, courts have
seemingly narrowed the use of the doctrine. Such cases suggest that the
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing could not be used to override ex-
press contractual provisions authorizing the conduct or action of which
the franchisee was complaining. 3
Perhaps the most recognized case involving the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the encroachment context is Scheck v. Burger
King Corp.4 Recently, however, the central issue surrounding the current
uncertainty in encroachment law is whether, or when, a court should im-
ply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to a franchise agreement. 5
Although express language in a franchise agreement will prevent the ap-
plication of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Carvel Corp. v.
Baker6 acknowledges the possibility that express language may not pro-
vide complete protection against a court's application of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. Carvel, the franchisor, entered into
a franchise agreement that reserved trademark rights to it. After a con-
flict arose under this first form franchise agreement, Carvel modified the
reservation clause. The court, holding that Carvel's two individual con-
tract clauses conflicted, analyzed the contract as a whole.7 The court con-
cluded that interpreting the first agreement was a fact question for the
jury.8 Therefore, Carvel's motion for summary judgment was denied.
While good faith and fair dealing continues to receive significant atten-
tion in the area of encroachment, the doctrine has also been invoked in
cases involving allegations of a franchisor's inequitable or inappropriate
conduct. For example, in America's Favorite Chicken Co. v. Cajun Enter-
prises, Inc.,9 the Fifth Circuit rejected a franchisee's claim that the
franchisor breached the franchise agreement by failing to: (1) allocate ad-
vertising funds to its local market, and (2) provide continuous advisory
3. For example, see Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that any competition created by the franchisor did not breach the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing because, in the franchise agreement, the franchisor specifi-
cally reserved the right to establish competing businesses in the franchise agreement). See
also, Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) & 10,762 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
19, 1995).
4. 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991), on rehearing, 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
5. See Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396,
1403 (11th Cir. 1998) (demonstrating the importance of precise and particular franchise
drafting as a means to avoid a court's implication of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The Camp Creek court distinguished two situations: (1) when the parties include
contract language on the issue of competing franchises, the implied covenant cannot alter
the express terms; and (2) when there is no such language, the franchisor may not, in bad
faith, capitalize on the franchisee.).
6. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17609 (D.Conn. July 22, 1997). Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) 11,208, at 29,680.
7. See id. at *18-19.
8. See id. at *21.
9. 130 F.3d 180, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1997).
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assistance. The court reasoned that there could be no violation of the
franchise agreement because the agreement gave the franchisor sole dis-
cretion over advertising placement and because the franchisor would
make ongoing assistance available if it deemed appropriate. 10 The court
also concluded that the franchisee could not assert a good faith and fair
dealing claim for failing to provide ongoing assistance.'I Louisiana law,
which requires the franchisee to show an intentional, malicious failure to
perform in order to prove breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, governed the franchise agreement.12 The franchisee
failed to meet this burden.
B. FIDUCIARY DUTY
Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar International'3 is the seminal Texas
case addressing the existence of a fiduciary duty between a franchisor and
franchisee. In Crim Truck, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appel-
late court's reversal of a jury verdict finding a fiduciary relationship be-
tween a franchisor and franchisee, because the court found no evidence
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between Navistar (formerly In-
ternational Harvester) and the Crim family who had operated a Navistar
franchise since 1943.14 Any evidence of confidence, trust, and reliance
over the parties' forty-two-year relationship was not evidence of a rela-
tionship that required Navistar to put the Crims' interests before its own,
because:
this argument clashes with the rule that a party to a contract is free to
pursue its own interests, even if it results in a breach of that contract,
without incurring tort liability. The fact that one businessman trusts
another, and relies upon his promise to perform a contract, does not
rise to a confidential relationship. Every contract includes an ele-
ment of confidence and trust that each party will faithfully perform
his obligation under the contract.' 5
Thus, under Texas law, neither a franchisor/franchisee nor a supplier/dis-
tributor relationship will be considered the type of formal relationship
that automatically creates a fiduciary duty.16
In ARA Automotive Group,17 an automotive parts distributor asserted
a fiduciary duty claim against an automotive parts manufacturer. The dis-
tributor claimed that its long-term, close relationship with the manufac-
turer, along with the manufacturer's possession of allegedly
"confidential" information about the distributor's business, created a fi-
10. See id. at 182.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. 823 S.W.2d 591(Tex. 1992).
14. See id. at 592.
15. Id. at 594-95.
16. See id. at 594; see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); ARA Automotive Group v. Central Garage,
Inc., 124 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1997).
17. 124 F.3d at 720.
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duciary relationship. The Fifth Circuit refused to recognize a fiduciary
relationship because: (1) neither party expressly agreed to put the other's
interests ahead of its own; (2) the written agreements between the parties
expressly provided for each party's obligations; (3) there was no agree-
ment to share profits or losses; and (4) the manufacturer exercised no
control over the distributor.18
C. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
Wrongful termination cases depend largely upon which party wins the
race to the courthouse. When a franchisee faces an impending termina-
tion, the franchisee may file suit first in an effort to preserve the franchise
by injunctive relief and to assert damage claims against the franchisor.
Four common issues arise in franchise termination litigation: (1) whether
the franchisor's termination was proper; (2) whether the franchisor vio-
lated disclosure requirements; (3) whether the franchisor made fraudu-
lent representations; and (4) whether the franchisor failed to provide
services in accordance with the franchise agreement.
A franchisor or distributor may seek to treat the franchisee's breach of
contract as a "constructive termination" (or "de facto termination") by
claiming that the breach effectively terminates the contract. A claim of
constructive termination was unsuccessful in Ward's Equipment, Inc. v.
New Holland North America, Inc.19 The manufacturer informed the
plaintiff, a farm equipment dealer, that it would not consent to any sale or
assignment of the plaintiff's dealership, because the manufacturer's cur-
rent market plan did not require a dealership at the dealer's location.
The manufacturer then began supplying a competitor fifteen miles away
while continuing to supply the dealer and honor its agreement. The
dealer sued the manufacturer, claiming breach of contract, wrongful ter-
mination, encroachment, promissory estoppel, and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court affirmed all of the
judgments from which the dealer appealed. 20 The wrongful termination
claim failed because there was no termination; the manufacturer contin-
ued to supply the original dealer and the competitive dealer.21 The
breach of contract claim failed because the contract authorized the manu-
facturer's conduct. 22 The promissory estoppel claim failed because Vir-
ginia law did not recognize the doctrine's application in this fact
scenario.23 Finally, the claims of good faith and fair dealing failed be-
cause the implied covenant could not be used to override express contrac-
tual terms.24
18. See id. at 726-27.
19. 493 S.E.2d 516, 519 (Va. 1997).
20. See id. at 521.
21. See id. at 519-20.
22. See id. at 519.
23. See id. at 520.
24. See id. See also Dunafon v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 93-4490-CV-C-9, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22026, at *23, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,239, at 29,854 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 2,
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It is unusual for a franchisee to obtain a preliminary injunction against
termination of a franchise primarily because an adequate damage remedy
exists for wrongful termination. But in Rothman v. Re/Max of New York,
Inc.25 the court granted a franchisee's request for a preliminary injunction
despite the franchisor's failure to pay royalties. The preliminary injunc-
tion prevented the franchisor from terminating the franchise before the
parties completed arbitration. The franchisee established that there was a
reasonable chance for success on the merits and that a denial of the in-
junction would result in the termination of the franchisee's business, ren-
dering the pending arbitration moot. The court, unlike many other courts
on this subject, found that damages "would not be an adequate substitute
for uninterrupted continuation of the franchise. ' 26 Note, however, that
the pending arbitration was on an expedited schedule and was to be com-
pleted within sixty days.
D. TRANSFER OF FRANCHISE RIGHTS
Franchisors commonly require a general release before approving a
franchise transfer. While some states regulate a franchisor's ability to re-
quire such a release, a California court validated a franchise agreement
term requiring release before transferring a franchise to a new location.27
Obtaining the franchisor's formal approval before proceeding with a
transfer is also important. 28
1997), in which the court dismissed a constructive or de facto termination claim as redun-
dant of the breach of contract claim.
25. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 11,299, at 30,127 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 27, 1997).
26. Id.
27. See Alberts v. Southland Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 11,219, at 29,723
(S.D. Cal. July 18, 1997). In Alberts, the franchisor demanded, as provided for in the
franchise agreement, release of all claims that the franchisee may have had arising from the
existing franchise agreement before the franchisor would allow the franchisee to relocate
without paying additional franchise fees. The franchisee claimed that this requirement was
a breach of contract and constituted unfair competition. The court found that the release
was not a breach but merely a condition precedent to the execution of a new agreement
terminating the old franchise arrangement and installing a new franchise at the new loca-
tion. See id. The release did not constitute unfair competition because it did not apply to
other franchises owned by plaintiff, only to the franchise that the plaintiff wanted to move.
See id. at 29,723-24.
28. Stroh Brewery Co. v. Western Md. Distrib. Co., No. 96-2705, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34027, at *2, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 11,304, at 30,142 (4th Cir. Dec 3,1997)
illustrates the importance of obtaining the franchisor's formal approval of a transfer before
proceeding. In this case, the franchise agreement provided for automatic termination if the
franchise was transferred without the manufacturer's approval. The plaintiff agreed to buy
the franchise from the prior franchisee, and both parties sought approval from Stroh and
Stroh's representatives for the transfer. The transfer occurred before Stroh gave its official
approval, and Stroh terminated the agreement when it learned that the transfer had been
finalized. The court granted summary judgment to Stroh and dismissed the plaintiff's
claims of promissory estoppel, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, and violations




The number of suits seeking to hold franchisors liable for the acts or
omissions of their franchisees is on the rise. Courts faced with these cases
apply traditional agency law to determine whether a franchisor is vicari-
ously liable for the actions of the franchisee. In determining whether a
franchisor is vicariously liable, courts focus on two agency theories: (1)
actual agency; and (2) apparent (ostensible) agency.
Texas law requires a party asserting agency to prove that the principal
has both the right to assign the agent's tasks and the right to control the
means and details by which the agent will accomplish those tasks.29
Moreover, the right to control must pertain to a task or matter that is
material to the lawsuit. 30
Under the right to control test, a court examines whether the
franchisor has a contractual right to control the franchisee in the detail of
its work. If the franchise agreement contains an express "no agency rela-
tionship" clause, the party attempting to prove agency must establish that
the true operating agreement between the parties actually vested control
with the franchisor. 31
Even in the products liability arena, the same rule applies. In Jackson
v. Coldspring Terrace Property Owners Association,32 Jackson, rendered a
quadriplegic after diving into a swimming pool owned by the Association,
alleged that the pool, built by a licensee of Blue Haven Pools, was negli-
gently designed and built. Jackson also claimed that Blue Haven failed to
police its trademark and maintain control over the quality of pools its
licensee built and marketed. The court first recognized the absence of
Texas authority on licensor/franchisor liability for sale of defective prod-
ucts. 33 Jackson's strict liability claims were largely based on: (1) sections
400 and 402 of the Restatement of Torts; and (2) the stream of commerce
theory. The court refused to apply either of these strict liability theories
to licensors/franchisors. 34 As for the trademark policing claim, the court
recognized that the question of whether a private cause of action exists
for failure to control quality was uncertain but noted that a trademark
owner could be held vicariously liable if it puts out as its own a product
manufactured by another.35 A finding of vicarious liability requires proof
that the licensor/franchisor of the trademark was significantly involved in
29. See Newspapers Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 590-91 (Tex. 1964); Webster v. Lip-
sey, 787 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Johson v.
Owens, 629 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. See Exxon v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1993) (stating that "the nature of the
matters to which the right of control extends [is] determinative"); Barnes v. Wendy's Int'l
Inc., 857 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
31. For example, see O'Bryant v. Century 21 S. Cent. States, Inc., 899 S.W.2d 270, 272
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
32. 939 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
33. See id at 765.
34. See id. at 768.
35. See id. at 767.
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the design, manufacture, or distribution of the defective product. 36 In
this case, however, the court granted summary judgment to Blue Haven
and specifically refused to adopt a private cause of action against a licen-
sor/franchisor for failure to police a trademark. 37
Notwithstanding the long established rules regarding franchisor liabil-
ity for the acts of a franchisee, the Texas Supreme Court decision Read v.
Scott Fetzer Co. d/b/a the Kirby Co. 38 provides the potential for increased
franchisor liability in the franchise arena. In Kirby, a door-to-door vac-
uum cleaner salesman, who by himself was an independent contractor of
Kirby's distributor, raped a customer during an in-home demonstration.
The customer sued Kirby, the manufacturer, for damages arising from the
acts of the door-to-door salesman. Although the appellate court reversed
a jury's punitive damages award against Kirby, it affirmed the actual dam-
ages award. 39
Affirming the appellate court decision, the Texas Supreme Court fo-
cused on the question of "whether a company that markets and sells its
products through independent contractor distributors and exercises con-
trol by requiring in-home demonstration and sales, owes a duty to act
reasonably in the exercise of that control. '40 Although the Kirby deci-
sion was "not based on a notion of vicarious liability, but upon the prem-
ise that Kirby is responsible for its own actions, ''41 the court focused on
the fact that Kirby retained "control of specific details of the work by
requiring the 'in home' sales of its vacuum cleaners. '42 Although the dis-
tributor agreement between Kirby and its dealers contained a "no agency
relationship" clause, the court concluded that "Kirby did in fact retain
control by requiring in-home sales."'43
As Justice Abbott points out in his dissent, the plaintiff's injury was
related to Kirby's failure to perform a background check on a prospective
salesman.4 The injury arising from this failure "specifically related to the
control that Kirby abrogated [in its distributor agreements]-control over
the selection of dealers. '45 Thus, the decision "rewrites Kirby's Distribu-
tor Agreement and Independent Dealer Agreement to require Kirby to
assume control over dealer selection. '46 Justice Hecht cautioned that the
court's attempt to "prevent its decision from impacting the multitude of
businesses similar to Kirby's" will likely fail.47
Problems arise in the application of the right to control test when con-
36. See id. at 765..
37. See id. at 769.
38. No. 97-0707, 1998 Tex. LEXIS 160 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1998).
39. See id. at *5.
40. Id. at *1.
41. Id. at *6.
42. Id. at *7.
43. Id. at *9.
44. See id. at *14.
45. Id. at *15-16.
46. Id. at *16.
47. Id. at *39.
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sidering the effect of the Lanham Act. 48 Most franchisors, as national
entities, retain certain rights and powers under their franchise agreements
to protect intangible property rights. The Lanham Act permits a trade-
mark owner to license the use of its mark to a franchisee, provided that
the mark is not used in a manner to deceive the public. 49 Thus, the Lan-
ham Act contemplates that the franchisor may lose its mark by abandon-
ment if it is not used, or if the manner in which it is used causes the mark
to lose its significance as an indication of origin. Therefore, a franchisor
to some extent must regulate its licensee's activities in order to preserve
its property rights and protect the public against deceptive uses of its
trademarks.
In the absence of any other evidence of a right to control, franchisees
often attempt to establish that the franchisor's Lanham Act duties create
the necessary level of control for an agency relationship. The argument is
that a franchisor, in protecting its intellectual property rights, meets the
requirements for the right to control test. Texas courts, however, have
consistently refused to find a right to control based on a franchisor's duty
to protect intangible property rights.50
F. CONTRACT CLAIMS
The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is contractual.
Thus, when no termination statute applies, Texas courts analyze the con-
tract to determine whether termination was proper. In Star Houston, Inc.
v. Texas Department of Transportation,51 the court upheld a Texas De-
partment of Transportation ruling that an auto dealer breached its dealer-
ship agreement by refusing to participate in the manufacturer's new
signage program. The dealer's refusal to participate constituted good
cause, under the Texas Motor Vehicle dealer law, for terminating the
dealership agreement.5 2
Franchise and dealer agreements typically restrict the freedom to sell
or otherwise dispose of the franchisee's or dealer's business. Challenges
to transfer restrictions require courts to examine a franchisor's withhold-
ing of consent or its imposition of transfer conditions. In Aalok Anita v.
Shell Oil Co.,5 3 the court concluded that a franchisor's express contrac-
tual right to demand a release of claims before consenting to a franchise
transfer was valid. In other jurisdictions, however, a franchisor's demand
for a release before transfer may not be enforceable. In Franchise Man-
agement v. America's Favorite Chicken,54 the Michigan Court of Appeals
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
49. See id. at § 45(a).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Foodmaker, 928 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996,
no writ); O'Bryant, 899 S.W.2d at 272.
51. 957 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
52. See id.
53. No. 14-95-00682-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4234, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist] 1996, no writ).
54. 561 N.W.2d 123, 125-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
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overturned the trial court's holding that such a provision was unenforce-
able under the Michigan Franchise Investment Law. The case is currently
before the Michigan Supreme Court, and an opinion will be rendered
after this paper is published.
Other significant cases include Yankee Enterprises, Inc. v. Dunkin'
Donuts, Inc.55 in which the Fifth Circuit overturned a jury's award of
damages and attorney's fees for a franchisee's breach of contract claim.
The franchisee claimed that Dunkin' Donuts' reduction of franchise su-
pervisory personnel and failure to maintain system standards constituted
a breach of contract. The court concluded that no damages arose from
this alleged breach.56 In RE/Max of Texas, Inc. v. Katar Corp.,57 the
court held that RE/Max had breached its franchise agreement by termi-
nating the franchisee's exclusivity.
G. CONTRACT-TORT DISTINCTION
The distinction between tort and contract is more than theoretical be-
cause parties contract to minimize future risk.58 Allowing open-ended
tort damages to distort contract relations turns every contract into a po-
tentially riskier proposition.59 The rule in Texas has long been that mere
nonfeasance under a contract creates liability only for breach of con-
tract.61 To help clarify the boundary between contract claims and other
causes of action, Texas courts consider both: (1) the source of the defend-
ant's duty to act and (2) the nature of the remedy that a plaintiff seeks.61
As a practical matter, when a party's duty to act arises solely from a con-
tract and the opposing party is seeking benefit of the bargain damages,
the party's failure to perform will not constitute a tort.62
Formosa Plastic Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers and Contractors63
symbolizes a retreat from previous limitations on tort claims. The For-
mosa Plastic court recognized that "tort damages are recoverable for a
fraudulent inducement claim irrespective of whether the fraudulent rep-
resentations are later subsumed in a contract or whether the plaintiff only
suffers an economic loss related to the subject matter of the contract." 64
When one party enters into a contract with no intention of performing
that contract, the misrepresentation of a willingness to perform a future
act may give rise to a fraud action if the intent was to deceive the other
55. 121 F.2d 703, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) & 11,211, at 29,691 (5th Cir. July 8,
1997) (unpublished table decision).
56. See id. at 29,693.
57. 961 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. App. - Houston [Ist Dist.] 1997, no writ).
58. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d at 331, 346
(4th Cir. 1998).
59. See id.
60. See Crim Truck, 823 S.W. 2d at 597.
61. See Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. 1996); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1991).
62. See Delanney, 809 S.W.2d at 495.
63. 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
64. Id. at 47.
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party. 65 Thus, a claim for fraudulent inducement requires proof of a
fraudulent intent not to perform the contract at the outset.
H. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Franchisees, licensees, and distributors continue to assert claims based
on the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA).66 In Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp.,67 homeowners as-
serted DTPA violations against the manufacturer of defective
polybutylene plumbing systems. The court first recognized that privity of
contract is not a prerequisite for DTPA consumer status. After consider-
ing the privity issue, the court went on to conclude that the manufacturer
was not liable under the DTPA, because any deceptive conduct must oc-
cur in connection with consumer transactions. 68 Because no proof ex-
isted that deceptive conduct occurred in this manner, DTPA liability did
not follow.
ARA Automotive Group v. Central Garage, Inc.69 addressed the issue
of encroachment under the DTPA. A distributor alleged that a manufac-
turer violated the DTPA by opening a retail store in the same geographic
area as the distributor. The appellate court upheld the jury's verdict that
the manufacturer did not violate the DTPA, even if the manufacturer's
store was in direct competition with its distributor.70
Finally, in Yankee Enterprises71 the Fifth Circuit concluded that a
franchisor's reduction of its supervisory force and/or failure to maintain
system standards will not support a DTPA claim of gross disparity or
unconscionability.
III. MARKETING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
A. MISREPRESENTATION
Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Regulation Rule entitled
"Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures" (the Disclosure Rule), the FTC promul-
gated pre-sale disclosure requirements for franchises and certain business
opportunity ventures. 72 The Disclosure Rule requires disclosure, but not
registration, in connection with the offer and sale of franchises in the
United States. The Disclosure Rule requires disclosure of twenty differ-
ent categories of information that the FTC has determined are important
65. See id. at 46-47.
66. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1996).
67. 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996).
68. See id. at 647.
69. 124 F.3d at 720.
70. See id. at 722-23, 730.
71. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,211, at 29,692.
72. 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1997). According to this rule, franchisors must make a full
presale disclosure. A franchisor may not legally offer and sell franchises in a state in which
the franchisor has failed to register, and illegal offers or sales create stiff civil and criminal
liability for the franchisor as well as its officers. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1994).
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to potential franchisees. 73 To accomplish this disclosure task, the FTC
requires compliance with the Disclosure Rule through the issuance of a
Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (the UFOC).
The FTC is authorized to seek injunctions and civil penalties and to
assist in consumer redress against Disclosure Rule violations. Since the
Disclosure Rule's 1979 inception, the FTC has determined a wide array
of misrepresentations to be unfair and deceptive practices. The following
cases provide guidance for Texas practitioners to determine the type of
disclosure that the FTC Disclosure Rule requires.
In United States v. QX International, Inc.,74 the FTC alleged that the
defendants failed to disclose relevant information within the time re-
quirements of the FTC Disclosure Rule. The allegations included alleged
misrepresentations regarding earnings potential, reliability of company-
selected references, territorial protection, and the amount of advertising
provided to customers. The FTC criticized the defendants' advertising
the sale of distributorships and earnings potential in classified ads. Once
the parties met, the defendants made the same claims. According to the
FTC, the defendants rarely achieved their earnings claims, and the sales
figures disclosed for existing distributorships were not even average esti-
mates of the earnings potential purchasers could reasonably expect.
In FTC v. Summit Photographix,75 the defendants used seminars to sell
trading card and postcard businesses. At these seminars, the defendants
made representations about the profitability of the businesses and guar-
anteed exclusivity rights within specific market areas. Defendants would
later contact new purchasers of the business venture and reassure them of
the potential business earnings and the guaranty of geographic exclusiv-
ity. Defendants would then use this later contact to induce the purchaser
to buy additional products from them. The FTC alleged that this conduct
violated the Disclosure Rule.
Finally, in FTC v. AmeraPress, Inc.76 the defendants invited prospec-
tive purchasers to attend informational seminars where they provided the
purchasers with annual earning estimations. The FTC alleged that the
defendants misrepresented the specific earning levels purchasers could
expect to receive and expanded on the misrepresentations by making fol-
low up phone calls espousing the same profitability claims.
The following cases underscore the difficulties that a franchisee faces
when pursuing private actions under state law. In America's Favorite
Chicken,77 a franchisee alleged fraudulent inducement and misrepresen-
tation resulting from the franchisor's promise of increased sales. The
court dismissed the franchisee's fraud claims because: (1) the franchise
agreement specifically disclaimed reliance upon any extra-contractual
73. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a).
74. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,353 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 1998).
75. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,355 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 1998).
76. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,353 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 1998).
77. 130 F.3d at 183.
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representations and (2) the statements were projections of possible future
events, not subject to a fraud action under Louisiana law.78 The court
also dismissed the franchisee's misrepresentation claims regarding the
franchisor's failure to disclose equipment problems and the opening of a
competitor next door, because the franchisee was a sophisticated pur-
chaser who could have investigated the condition of the building and
learned of the competitor's relocation.79
In Hotels of Key Largo, Inc. v. RHI Hotels, Inc.,80 franchisees sought
rescission of licensing agreements based upon the franchisor's failure to
honor three promises relating to: (1) benefits associated with becoming a
part of the Radisson Hotel network (i.e., access to the worldwide reserva-
tion system of 4,500 travel agents); (2) becoming the sole beneficiaries of
the reservation system in the Florida Keys; and (3) the percentage of
their room reservations that would be derived from the reservation sys-
tem and travel agents. The court held that the franchisees were not justi-
fied in relying on the representations, because the license agreements
contained clear, unambiguous language outlining the parties' rights and
obligations and contained an integration clause.81 The court also rea-
soned that the economic loss rule bars certain fraudulent inducement
claims, because contract law and tort law are separate. Courts should
maintain that separation in the remedies allowed.82
In Loehr v. Hot Now, Inc.,8 3 a fast food franchisee allegedly relied on
statements made by the franchisor regarding the sale of the franchise to
Pepsico and plans for future expansion. The court rejected the fran-
chisee's claim that the representations destroyed its business and held
that a franchisor could not be held liable for any statement made regard-
ing future intentions, absent an affirmative action by the defendant evi-
dencing an intent to be bound by the statement.8 4
In Pang v. Jani King of California, Inc. ,85 the court determined that a
commercial cleaning franchisor, which structured its franchise program
based on the amount of monthly contract business a franchisee
purchased, was making an earnings claim as defined by the UFOC
Guidelines. The franchisor's subsequent omission of the required earn-
ings claims disclosures in the franchisor's offering circular was a willful
violation under the California Franchise Investment Law.86 The court
further held that the franchisor's registration of the franchise offering cir-
cular was not a defense to disclosure violations because registration did
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. 694 So.2d 74 (Fla. App. 1997).
81. See id. at 75-76.
82. See id. at 77.
83. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,352, at 30, 388 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 1998).
84. See id.





not constitute regulatory approval of the franchisor's omissions.87
B. DISCLOSURE
1. Disclosures and Exemptions Under the Federal Trade Commission
Over the last year, the FTC issued a number of Staff Advisory Opin-
ions regarding disclosure requirements. In Informal Staff Advisory Opin-
ion No. 97-5,88 the FTC noted that direct communications by a franchisor
to financial journals and trade press in connection with bona fide news
releases do not constitute earnings representations. When a franchisor,
however, disseminates those articles to prospective franchisees, the
franchisor effectively ratifies the news stories and converts the article to
an advertising piece, thereby making it an earnings claim.
The FTC confronted the practical issue of whether, under the FTC
Rule, a franchisor must provide a disclosure document to an existing
franchisee who purchases an additional outlet.8 9 When a franchise agree-
ment provides for additional outlets, the franchisor will not be obligated
to provide disclosure unless the new relationship is under materially dif-
ferent terms and conditions, or if there has been a material change con-
cerning the franchisor's business or the terms under which a new outlet
would operate. 90
As the Internet has expanded, so has the reach of the FTC. In FTC v.
Greenhorse Communications, Inc.,9" the FTC filed a complaint alleging
that Greenhorse ran promotions on the Internet and in newspaper ads
claiming that franchisees could expect to earn as much as $134,000, work-
ing only part-time, within their first year of business for a minimum in-
vestment of $14,000 to $15,000. According to the FTC, Greenhorse
violated the FTC rule by failing to provide the required disclosure or
earnings substantiation documents. A consent decree was entered which:
(1) prohibited Greenhouse from violating the FTC Rule in the future; (2)
required it to send recission notice to each franchisee; and (3) enjoined
Greenhouse from disclosing names, addresses, telephone numbers, or any
other identifying information of any franchisee.92
Under section 18(g) of the FTC Act, an applicant may petition the FrC
for an exemption to FTC trade rules or regulations dealing with unfair or
deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce. 93 If the FrC finds an ap-
plication of a rule to be unnecessary to prevent deceptive or unfair prac-
tices, it may grant an exemption.
Recently, an exemption evaluation was conducted for Navistar Interna-
87. See id.
88. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 6485, at 9686 (July 31, 1997).
89. See Informal Staff Advisory Opinion No. 97-8, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
6488, at 9691 (Dec. 8, 1997).
90. See id.
91. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,402 (D. N.H. May 13, 1998).
92. See id. at 30,645-46.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(g) (1994).
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tional Transportation Corp.94 The truck manufacturer claimed that the
application of the Disclosure Rule to its dealership sales was unnecessary
because: (1) its dealers are sophisticated business people with experience
in the industry; and (2) the negotiation process leading to the execution
of the dealership agreement occurs over a period of four months to one
year, ensuring adequate time for review. Navistar also claimed it had an
interest in ensuring that its dealers were committed and well financed.
2. Uniform Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines
On August 7, 1998, the North American Securities Administrators As-
sociation, Inc. (NASAA) released for public comment a restated com-
mentary relating to UFOC Guidelines.95 These Guidelines are to act as
an alternative form of disclosure document permitted by the FTC. The
restated commentary addresses issues including risk factors, "predeces-
sor" and "affiliate" definitions, litigation disclosures, non-uniform fees
and fees paid to third parties, sourcing restrictions, financing, advertising
funds, training staff, computer hardware and software, subfranchisor dis-
closure, and disclosure concerning international outlets. The comment
period ended October 30, 1998.96
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
On May 3, 1998, NASAA adopted a Statement of Policy regarding of-
fers of franchises on the Internet.97 Under the Statement of Policy, in-
ternet offers will be exempted from state registration requirements if: (1)
the offer indicates that the franchise is not being offered to residents of
that state; (2) the offer is not directed to any person in the state by or on
behalf of a franchisor or anyone acting with the franchisor's knowledge;
and (3) no franchise is sold in the state by or on behalf of the franchisor
until the offering has been registered and declared effective and an offer-
ing circular delivered to the prospective purchaser in compliance with the
state's franchise law.98 The goal is to create a uniform approach to han-
dling internet franchise offers. To date, only Indiana and Maryland have
adopted such exemptions.99
D. FIC ENFORCEMENT POWERS
Under section 5(a) of the FTC Act, the FTC has the authority to initi-
ate a court proceeding to prevent unfair and deceptive practices that af-
fect commerce, including violations of the Disclosure Rule. 100 Under
94. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,390, at 30,573.
95. See NASA Proposed Statement of Policy-1998 Commentary on the Uniform
Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,485, at 31,088
(Aug. 7, 1998).
96. See id. at 31,089.
97. See Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) j 11,391; NASAA Reports (CCH) 3939.
98. See Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9 11,391 at 30,574.
99. See Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) j 5200; Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 5140.01.
100. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1998).
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section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the court has the ability to grant injunctive
and other ancillary relief.101
Two enforcement actions are noteworthy. In the first, the FTC alleged
claims of corporate and individual violations of the Disclosure Rule.
10 2
The complaint sought injunctive relief although it presented no evidence
that the defendants were currently violating the FTC Act or were likely
to do so in the future. The court decided that it had the power to enjoin
the defendant based on the defendant's past conduct. 10 3 In the second
action, the defendant sought to stay a FTC action during the investigation
of its corporate officer in a parallel criminal case. 10 4 Because the public's
interest in a speedy resolution of civil suits outweighed the problems in-
curred by the defendant's officer, the court denied the stay.10 5 The of-
ficer could assert the Fifth Amendment in the criminal proceeding and
simply have another officer represent the defendant in the FTC action.
The FTC also enters into a number of consent decrees each year. In
FTC v. Majors Medical Supply, Inc.,106 the FTC filed a proposed consent
decree involving a franchisor of medical equipment businesses and its two
principal officers The consent decree prohibited the franchisor and its of-
ficers from making misrepresentations in connection with the sale of any
franchise. The decree also required franchisors to release all former and
current franchisees from franchise agreement obligations. Finally, the
two principal officers were required to post performance bonds of
$1,000,000 before engaging in the sale of any business venture
franchises.' 0 7
FTC v. Carousel of Toys USA, Inc.108 involved a franchisor of display
racks and one of its directors. The FTC claimed that the franchisor and
director violated the Disclosure Rule and made misrepresentations in vi-
olation of the FTC Act. The decree enjoined defendants from violating,
or assisting others in violating, the FTC Act or the Disclosure Rule in
connection with the sale of any franchise or business opportunity. The
director agreed to cooperate with the FTC and other law enforcement
agencies in ongoing investigations and agreed to testify before a federal
grand jury if asked to do so.109
The FTC alleged that corporate marketers and a candy vending
franchisor made material misrepresentations to franchise buyers and
failed to disclose key information to prospective purchasers in FTC v.
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
102. See FTC v. Hayes, No. 4:96-CV-2162, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7805 (E.D. Mo. May
7, 1997); Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,201, at 29,644.
103. See id. at *6.
104. See FI'C v. Parade of Toys, Inc., No. 97-2367, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17153; (D.
Kan. Oct. 15, 1997), Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,292, at 30,106.
105. See id. at *5-6.
106. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,245, at 29,886 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 1997).
107. See id. at 29,889.
108. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,267, at 29,977 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 29, 1997).
109. See id. at 29,980.
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Stillwater Vending Ltd.110 The defendants consented to a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting the defendants from misrepresenting the sale of
candy vending machine business ventures or other related products or
services. The injunction further required the defendants to post a
$100,000 performance bond before selling additional vending ma-
chines.111 The defendants also had to submit financial reports to the
court and FTC. Pending resolution of the allegations, the defendants'
assets were frozen.11 2
Finally, in FTC v. Independent Travel Agencies of America, Inc.,' 13 the
FTC claimed that the owner of a home-based travel agency misled pro-
gram buyers. The proposed consent decree permanently enjoined the
owner from misrepresenting that purchasers would be able to operate
functional, independent travel agencies or that they would be supported
by major travel service providers.114 The decree also permanently en-
joined the owner from engaging in the marketing or sale of any business
opportunity relating to travel agencies.1 15
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. ARBITRATION
Various threshold issues often arise before parties can be compelled to
arbitrate. First, there must be an agreement to arbitrate the claims in
dispute. Courts are often called upon to determine these threshold is-
sues. For example, in Morse v. Sir Speedy, Inc.," 6 the franchise agree-
ment stated that all disputes, except certain ones involving intellectual
property, were to be arbitrated. Another provision stated that the party
aggrieved by a breach or default was to have all rights and privileges
available by law. The franchisee, relying on the latter clause, argued that
as the injured party it was entitled to a judicial remedy because such a
remedy was clearly available under the law. The court, attempting to give
meaning to all provisions of the contract, reasoned that if it interpreted
the contract as asserted by the franchisee, any case could be brought in
court and that would eviscerate the arbitration clause.117 Arbitration was
therefore ordered, and, to give meaning to the clause, the court empow-
ered the arbitrator to allow any remedy available at law.118
Arbitration has its own unique procedural issues. Sometimes each
party files for arbitration separately, and one or the other party may want
to consolidate the arbitration without a specific provision in the arbitra-
110. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 11, 240, at 29,855 (D. N.H. Sept. 9, 1997).
111. See id. at 29,858.
112. See id.
113. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,300, at 30,128 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 1997).
114. See id. at 30,129.
115. See id.
116. No. 97-40013, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18419 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1997); Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,320, at 30,212.
117. See id. at *4-5.
118. See id.
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tion agreement. For example, in Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal,
Inc. 19 the defendant brought a motion to consolidate two arbitration
proceedings before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or, in
the alternative, to stay the arbitration initiated by the plaintiff pending a
decision by the court of appeals on defendant's appeal of an earlier order
compelling arbitration. The AAA rejected defendant's motion, and the
defendant moved the court to consolidate the actions. Neither the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA), the franchise agreement, nor the Commer-
cial Rules of the AAA adopted by the parties in their agreement
provided for consolidation of arbitrations. The defendant argued that
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) should apply by reason of FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3),
which states that "[in proceedings under Title 9, U.S.C., relating to arbi-
tration ... these rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure
are not provided for in those statutes.' 20 The court rejected the argu-
ment because Rule 81(a)(3) applies only to judicial proceedings and not
to proceedings before an arbitrator.1 21 Because New Jersey law applied
to the franchise agreement, the defendant also argued that New Jersey
state law authorized the court to order consolidation of the arbitrations.
The court declined to decide whether New Jersey law allowed a court to
order consolidation because, even if such power existed, consolidation
would not be appropriate. 22 The court also denied the defendant's alter-
native motion to stay.123
Many arbitration clauses require that the arbitration take place in a
selected forum, usually the franchisor's home state. In an effort to pro-
tect franchisees, several states have adopted statutes making such forum
selection clauses unenforceable. Franchisors have challenged the right of
states to curtail their contractual arbitration agreements on the basis that
the FAA, which requires enforcement of arbitration agreements accord-
ing to their terms, preempts such statutes. A "tentative ruling" in Silka v.
Surface Doctor, Inc.124 adopted the franchisor's argument and held that
arbitration should be held in Atlanta, the selected forum in the arbitra-
tion clause. The court ruled that the FAA trumped the provision in the
California franchise law 125 that made such forum selection clauses
unenforceable. 126
A party desiring to enforce an arbitration agreement with a forum se-
lection clause may be required to go to the selected forum to do so. Sec-
tion 4 of the FAA requires that the arbitration hearing be held within the
district in which the petition for an order to arbitrate is filed.127 The
119. No. 97-1057, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9095 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1997), Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 11,200, at 29,639.
120. Id. at *8.
121. See id.
122. See id. at *15.
123. See id. at *17.
124. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,314, at 30,185 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1997).
125. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20,040.5 (1998).
126. See Silka, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) at 30,185-86.
127. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1998).
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court in Im v. ATL International, Inc.12 ruled that where there is a forum
selection clause in the arbitration agreement, the party seeking to enforce
it must file its petition to compel arbitration in a court in the district in
which the selected forum is located. In the instant case, the franchisor
had filed a petition to compel arbitration in the selected forum and a few
days later the franchisee filed suit in its home state. The franchisor
moved to stay the home state litigation pending the outcome of the peti-
tion in the selected forum state, and the court granted the stay.129
B. CHOICE OF LAW
In analyzing which state's law to apply to an issue, the courts give
weight to the parties' choice of law provision in the franchise agreement.
In a dispute over the applicability of such a provision, the court will look
at the contacts that the transaction and parties have with the state chosen
and whether or not a strong public policy of the forum state would be
affected by applying the chosen state's laws.
The relationship between choice of law provisions in franchise agree-
ments and the applicability of a state's franchise law where jurisdiction
has been triggered was addressed in America's Favorite Chicken.130 The
franchise agreement between the fried chicken restaurant franchisee and
its franchisor contained a choice of law provision that stated that Louisi-
ana law applied to the interpretation or construction of the franchise
agreement. The court noted that claims under the California Franchise
Investment Law did not involve the interpretation or construction of the
franchise agreement and, therefore, were not resolved by reference to
that provision.13 '
This case also addressed the issue of whether Louisiana based suppliers
tortiously interfered with contracts by artificially inflating prices of prod-
ucts that the franchisees were required to purchase. 132 There was a con-
flict between California law and Louisiana law on this issue. California's
law on tortious interference claims was more expansive than that of Loui-
siana.133 The court found, however, that Louisiana had a more significant
relationship to the transaction. 134 The allegedly tortious conduct oc-
curred there, and Louisiana had an interest in shielding Louisiana corpo-
rations, such as the defendant, from unrecognized liability.135 This
outweighed California's interest in applying its expansive law to protect
California franchisees. 136
128. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) T 11,351, at 30,384-85 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 1998).
129. See id.
130. 130 F.3d at 182.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 183.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 183-84.





A state court has personal jurisdiction over any action brought in its
courts if the party's activities comply with the state's long-arm statute and
if the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Personal juris-
diction questions arise most often when a franchisor files suit against a
franchisee in a place other than the franchisee's state of residence, such as
the franchisor's principal place of business. In Fish v. Tandy Corp.,137 the
court concluded that a franchisee could be sued in the franchisor's home
state of Texas due to the franchisee's sufficient minimum contacts with
Texas. Sufficient contacts included the franchisee's long-running negotia-
tions and numerous direct contacts (personal visits, telephone, mail and
facsimile) with the franchisor in Texas. The franchisee visited Texas at
least three times to negotiate a distribution agreement that was eventu-
ally executed.
D. CLASS ACTIONS
The recent decision in Meineke, though not a Texas or Fifth Circuit
ruling, seriously restricts franchisee class actions. 138 In Meineke, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court's holding and remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings. 139 The class action suit cen-
tered on an advertising fund into which Meineke franchisees paid 10% of
their weekly revenues. Plaintiffs, in seeking classwide damage exceeding
$190 million, claimed Meineke improperly disbursed $32 million from the
fund. The jury, after trebling damages under the North Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act, returned an award against Meineke for
$390 million. 140
In overturning the trial court's decision, the Fourth Circuit pointed out
several errors by the trial court. First, with respect to class certification,
the Fourth Circuit determined that the disparate nature of the claims
among different groups of franchisees could conflict with each other and
thus precluded the franchisees' class certifications. 141 One conflict arose
because, during the pendency of litigation, Meineke offered its franchis-
ees a new franchise package in exchange for release of damage claims,
which excluded claims for replenishment of the advertising fund. 142 Half
of Meineke's franchisees accepted the new franchise package (termed the
EDP package), while the class representatives rejected the package.143
The Fourth Circuit determined that there was a serious conflict of in-
terest between the plaintiff class representatives and the EDP franchisees
who were part of the class, because "[p]ursuing a damage remedy that
137. 948 S.W.2d 886, 891-96 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
138. See Meineke, 155 F.3d at 352.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 337.
141. See id. at 337-39.




was at best irrelevant and at worst antithetical to the long-term interests
of a significant segment of the putative class added insult to the injury of
abandoning the only remedy in which that segment (the EDP franchis-
ees) was interested."'144 The court further recognized that the conflict
could not be cured by permitting the EDP franchisees to opt-out because
the trial court had certified a non-opt out class under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2). 145 Consequently, the EDP franchisees were forced against their
will to abandon their only claims for replenishment. 146
The franchisees further failed to satisfy the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a). 147 Because there were different contracts in-
volved, the court found merit in Meineke's argument that it was permit-
ted to make certain disbursements from the advertising fund.148 Relying
on Sprague v. General Motors Corp.,'149 the court held that "the plaintiffs
cannot amalgamate multiple contract actions into one;"' 50 however, the
court did not discuss whether the commonality problem could be cured
by creation of subclasses for different groups of contract holders.
Another failure of commonality was the fact that the fraud-related
claims depended on non-standardized oral presentations.' 5' The plain-
tiffs offered approximately 170 tapes into evidence in an attempt to assert
common misrepresentations contained in the UFOC's. The court re-
jected the assertion because there was no showing that all class members
received, read, or relied on them. 152 Furthermore, common law reliance
was an individualized issue, depending on the information available to
each franchisee from numerous sources.' 53
The final death knell for class certification was the court's determina-
tion that damages could not be proven on a classwide basis but, rather,
had to be proven on an individualized basis.154 The plaintiff's expert had
developed a classwide formula based on hypothetical averages rather
than attempting to compute damages on an individual basis. Such a
formula resulted in speculative damage awards. Lost profits can only be
computed on an individualized basis.155
The Fourth Circuit admonished the district court for transforming an
ordinary contract dispute into a tort action that allowed a claim under the
Unfair Trade Practices Act to piggy-back on a breach of contract claim.156
In remanding the contract claims against Meineke, the court indicated
144. Id. at 339.
145. See id. at 338.
146. See id. at 339.
147. See id. at 340.
148. See id.
149. 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
150. Meineke, 155 F.3d at 340.
151. See id. at 341.
152. See id. at 391.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 341-42.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 344-47.
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that the franchisees could still seek restitution and lost profits. 57 The
court even left open the possibility that "a class action might be used in a
carefully controlled manner .... But in various ways this lawsuit man-
aged to wander way beyond its legitimate origins, and at the end it spun
completely out of control, with a diffuse class and proliferating theories of
liability."1 58 The Fourth Circuit indicated its concern about the effect of
such judgments on corporate America by stating that "[i]f we permitted
this judgment to stand, commercial disputes and contract law would be
transformed-a string of tort claims advanced in a sprawling class action
would put many companies-and their corporate parents-out of
business."1 59
Franchise class actions are often brought on behalf of both past and
current franchisees. In Meineke the court noted a possible conflict be-
tween franchisees that did not materialize because the class representa-
tives (current franchisees) selected a remedy consistent with the interest
of former franchisees. Some cases have not permitted a current or past
franchisee to represent a class of both current and past franchisees on the
basis that there would be a conflict of interest. 160 For instance, the inter-
ests of the current franchisees to obtain certain relief from onerous con-
tract clauses and the interests of the past franchisees to obtain a money
judgment may conflict. The current franchisees may still have a desire to
continue operating their franchises, whereas the past franchisees seek
only damages. If such a claim is successful, the franchisor may not be
able to continue operating and the current franchisees' interests will not
be met.
But, in E & V Slack, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,16 ' class certification was
denied because former franchisees were deemed to have a conflict of in-
terest with current franchisees and therefore could not act as class repre-
sentatives. Shell operated a voluntary rent discount program, whereby
dealers would receive a discount on their monthly rent proportionate to
the amount of gas they sold over a particular level. Plaintiff claimed that
Shell, which operated a voluntary discount program based on the amount
of gas its dealers sold, subsidized this program by increasing its gasoline
prices. The plaintiff contended that the subsidization required greater
rent payments than the contract stipulated. Class certification was denied
because there were too many issues of fact not common to all class mem-
bers, making class action treatment an inferior form for litigating the
dispute. 162
The court further determined that named representatives could not
fairly and adequately represent the interests of other class members, be-
cause the class contained both present and former dealers while the
157. See id. at 352.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 452 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
161. 969 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex. App.- Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
162. See id. at 569-70.
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named representatives were former dealers only. 163 As a result, a conflict
between the named representatives and present dealers over the goal of
the litigation would arise because the named representatives desired to
eliminate the rent discount program and many present dealers did not.164
Furthermore, one of the named representatives presently owned several
Chevron stations, which competed directly with Shell. Thus, while all of
the present dealers had a reason to protect Shell's corporate goodwill,
this named representative had an interest in damaging Shell's goodwill. 165
In H&R Block, Inc. v. Haese,166 the class claimed that Block failed to
disclose payments that it received from lenders in exchange for arranging
loans in amounts of the clients' anticipated tax refunds. The class claimed
that this practice constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and an uncon-
scionable business practice under the DTPA. The court affirmed the class
certification decision because the requirements for class certification
were met, certification was not erroneous, and certification did not com-
promise Block's rights.1 67
Texas franchisors continue to have success against liability claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).168 After trying to apply the
ADA in the fast food franchise context, courts attempted to impose ADA
liability in the hotel franchise context. For example, in United States v.
Days Inns of America, Inc.,169 the court rejected the government's at-
tempt to impose ADA liability based upon the franchisor's control over
the standards in the franchise agreement and the operations manual.
Furthermore, the court concluded that a franchisor would not be deemed
an "operator" under the ADA. 70
In Cortez v. National Basketball Association,171 an advocacy group for
hearing impaired plaintiffs sued the National Basketball Association, as
franchisor, the San Antonio Spurs, as franchisee, and the owner of the
Alamodome seeking an injunction requiring captioning services as a rea-
sonable accommodation at NBA games. The court recognized that a
franchisor could be held liable under the ADA if it operates a public
place of accommodation.1 72 The key issue was whether the NBA specifi-
cally controlled the franchise's modifications to improve accessibility for
the disabled. The court determined that the NBA was not subject to the
ADA as a franchisor-operator because the guidelines on which the plain-
163. See id. at 568-69.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. 976 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1998, no pet. h.).
167. See id. at 240-41.
168. See Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995); Alonzo v.
American Dairy Queen Corp., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 10,563, at 26,198 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 26, 1994); Young v. American Dairy Queen Corp., No. 5:93-CV-253-C, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16909, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) T 10,542, at 26,108 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 1994).
169. No. 96-5012, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22947, at *9-11, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
11,323, at 30,232-33 (D. S.D. Oct. 29, 1997).
170. See id. at *11.
171. 960 F. Supp. 113 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
172. See id. at 115.
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tiffs relied did not support their theory that the NBA operated the
facility.1 73
E. ANTITRUST
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im-
age Technical Services, Inc.,' 74 substantial litigation has arisen regarding
franchising practices that require a franchisee to utilize specific supplies
or sources. Whether an antitrust case in this context will be successful
seems to depend on whether the franchisor's supply arrangements were
disclosed pre-contract or implemented as a post-contractual restriction.
In Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza 75 Domino's, the franchisor,
expressly retained the right to require all ingredients and materials to be
purchased "exclusively from [Domino's] or from approved suppliers or
distributors." Domino's later decided to exercise this contract clause. Its
franchisees alleged that it was not foreseeable that Domino's would un-
reasonably interfere with their attempts to find alternative supply
sources. The franchisees' claims of tying were twofold: (1) Domino's im-
posed an unlawful tying arrangement by requiring franchisees to buy in-
gredients and supplies from them as a condition of obtaining fresh dough;
and (2) Domino's imposed an unlawful tying arrangement by requiring
franchisees to buy ingredients and supplies as a condition of their contin-
ued enjoyment of rights and services under the franchise agreement.
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims
urged by the franchisees. 176 By focusing on the pre-contract stage as the
relevant period for market power analysis, the court concluded Domino's
economic power did not result from the unique nature of its products or
its market share in the fast food franchise business, but instead, its eco-
nomic power stemmed from the franchise agreement. 177 The court
pointed out that the supplies used by Domino's stores were interchangea-
ble with those available from other suppliers and used by other pizza
companies. 178 The fact that the franchisees during the pre-contract stage
had the capacity to assess and evaluate the potential costs and risks from
the approved supplier clause distinguishes this case from Kodak.1 79
In Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,180 (Wilson I), franchisees gained a short
lived victory for application of the Kodak analysis of relevant markets in
the franchise context. In Wilson I, a franchisee alleged that SpeeDee Oil
Change Systems, the franchisor, created an unlawful tying arrangement
by requiring franchisees to purchase Mobil's higher priced products. The
173. See id. at 117.
174. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
175. 124 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 1997).
176. See id. at 444.
177. See id. at 439-40.
178. See id.
179. See id.




Wilson I court would not limit the market analysis to the pre-contract
stage because the complaint and evidence were not clear on the extent of
pre-contract disclosures. 181 The court refused to allow a general conten-
tion that tie-ins disclosed at the outset of a franchise relationship are not
actionable, especially if the franchisee did not have enough information
to ascertain the life cycle pricing of a long-term exclusive supply
requirement. 182
One year later in Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,183 (Wilson II), the same
court, upon developing the record more thoroughly, characterized the
case as an "up front tie-in" and recognized that growing circuit authority
consistently finds that advance disclosure of the tying arrangement pre-
vents the purchaser from being locked in. Although Wilson H appears to
recognize the application of pre-contractual disclosure as a means to
avoid tie-ins, the court did not eliminate the possibility of employing a




Franchisees generally have a private right of action with remedies rang-
ing from actual damages, attorneys' fees, injunctive relief, rescission and,
in cases where fraudulent inducement can be established, tort damages.
Before lost profits may be awarded, the franchisee must establish that the
injury suffered was caused by the franchisor's wrongful conduct. Where a
franchisor is unable to establish this causal connection, dismissal of the
claim will often follow. 185
In Yankee Enterprises, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc.,186 a franchisee al-
leged the franchisor's failure to maintain high quality and uniform stan-
dards throughout its system resulted in damages. The jury found for the
franchisee for breach of contract and violations of the Texas DTPA.187
The court set aside the jury's verdict as based on conjecture and
surmise. 188 In its decision to set aside the jury verdict, the court recog-
nized that the franchisee's expert failed to account for other factors that
could have led to poor sales in the franchisee's region. 189 Furthermore,
the testimony of another franchisee, detailing poor quality standards at
one store that resulted in customers applying those same attributes to
181. See id. at 952-54.
182. See id. at 953-54.
183. 984 F. Supp. 450, 459 (E.D. La. 1997).
184. See id. at 460-61.
185. See Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Kessler, 931 P.2d 1270, Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) 11,109, at 29,143 & 29,146-47 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1997) (unpublished table
decision).
186. Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) at 29,691.
187. See id. at 29,692.




other stores in the system, was not supported by adequate proof.' 90 Thus,
the claims failed because the franchisee failed to prove causation.
It is not uncommon for shareholders of a franchised entity to seek re-
covery of damages for harm to the franchise. In Cottingham v. General
Motors,19 1 the court denied franchisee shareholders and employees of the
dealer standing to bring claims arising from the dealership agreement.
B. FRANCHISOR'S REMEDIES
1. Liquidated Damages
Many franchise agreements stipulate that a franchisor may recover liq-
uidated damages for a franchisee's breach of contract. These liquidated
damages clauses are generally enforceable, unless they are proven to be a
penalty provision.192
Under Texas law, a liquidated damages provision is enforceable if such
a clause constitutes "a reasonable forecast of the amount necessary to
render just compensation" and if the anticipated breach was "difficult or
impossible to estimate" at the time of contract formation. 193 A liquidated
damages clause will be considered unenforceable only when it operates as
a penalty or is "disproportionate to actual damages" at the time of
breach. 194 Indeed, Texas courts look favorably upon provisions in agree-
ments which fix specified amounts of damages-that is "liquidated dam-
ages"-in the event of breach. 195
Though no current Texas or Fifth Circuit cases address the availability
of liquidated damages in franchise cases, courts in other jurisdictions rou-
tinely enforce liquidated damage provisions in franchise agreements. 196
These decisions hold that liquidated damages provisions are enforceable
because of the inherent difficulty and impossibility of accurately estimat-
ing actual damages.' 97
2. Post-Termination Remedies for Use of Franchisor's Intellectual
Property
Termination does not necessarily mark the end of the franchisor/fran-
chisee relationship. As is often the case, an involuntarily terminated fran-
190. See id.
191. 119 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 1997).
192. See Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros Thanksgiving Partners, 64 F.3d 227 (5th
Cir. 1995).
193. See id. at 232. See also, Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991); R.
Conrad Moore & Assocs. v. Lerma, 946 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ).
194. See Baker v. International Record Syndicate, 812 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1991, no writ); Thanksgiving Tower, 64 F.3d at 232.
195. See, e.g., Murphy v. Cintas Corp., 923 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, writ
denied).
196. See, e.g., Downtowner/Passport Int'l Hotel Corp. v. Norlew, Inc., 841 F.2d 214,218
(8th Cir. 1988); Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Gadsen Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.
1986); Ramada Franchise Sys. v. Motor Inn Inv. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1570, 1578 (S.D. Ga.
1991).
197. See Ramada Franchise Sys., 755 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
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chisee may refuse to remove signage, promotional materials or other
items which identify the franchisee with the franchise system. To avoid
public confusion and dilution of the franchisor's marks, the injunction
remedy is extremely important.1 98 The Lanham Act provides the federal
statutory foundation for injunctions against terminated franchisees. 199
Three potential claims are available to a franchisor under the Lanham
Act when there is a continued, unauthorized use of its marks. Under
section 32(1) the commercial use of a registered mark "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive" and is "without consent of
the registrant" will form the basis for a Lanham Act claim.200 On the
other hand, section 43(a) protects both registered and unregistered marks
and makes unlawful "false designation of origin, false or misleading de-
scription of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, (a) [that] is
likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive as to... origin,
sponsorship or approval of" goods or services.201 Finally, section 43(c)
prohibits a party from using and "diluting" the quality of another party's
famous and distinctive marks. 20 2
198. The intent of the Lanham Act is to:
regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce: . . . to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition;.. .to prevent
fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). See also Ocean Garden v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th
Cir. 1991).
199. The Lanham Act expressly provides for injunctive relief to prevent infringement.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1998); see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175,
1180 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[1]njunctive relief is the remedy of choice for trademark and unfair
competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by a
[franchisee's] continuing infringement.").
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). The pertinent part of section 32 provides that:
(1) any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant -
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant...
Id.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). Section 43(a) provides, in part, as follows:
(1) [Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services... uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol or device . . . or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mis-
leading representation of fact which
(A) is likely to ... deceive as to the affiliation, connection or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person...
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
As for unregistered marks, see Controls Int'l, Inc. v. Kinetrol, Ltd., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4794, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1998).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Section 43(c) provides, in part, the following:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
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To obtain a preliminary injunction, many courts require a franchisor to
establish the following elements of the so-called "traditional" test: (1)
there is a substantial likelihood that the franchisor will prevail on the
merits; (2) the franchisor will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted; (3) the injury to the franchisor greatly outweighs any injury
the franchisee may suffer under the injunction; and (4) an injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest.20 3 Other courts may apply an
"alternative" test wherein the injunction may issue if the moving party
demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits
and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are
raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant's favor.20 4
Recent decisions indicate the importance of preliminary injunctions as
a procedural tool to combat trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tions. In Paisa, Inc. v. N&G Auto, Inc.,20 5 a terminated franchisee was
enjoined from using the franchisor's registered trademarks. The fran-
chisee was also enjoined from using the franchisor's confidential or pro-
prietary business information, order forms or other materials bearing
trademarks and/or tradenames.20 6
In Pappan Enterprises,20 7 the Third Circuit reversed a district court's
denial of preliminary injunction a franchisor sought. The franchisee ar-
gued that the franchisor's reduction in the number of franchisees demon-
strated a lack of interest in the franchise system. The circuit court
rejected this argument and noted that "[c]ourts have recognized that a
trademark owner's decision to reduce the size of its business or to cease
operations alone does not undermine the owner's legal right to enforce
and protect its trademark. ' '218
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunc-
tion against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such
other relief as is provided in this subsection.
Id.
203. See Pappan Enters. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998);
Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1979).
204. See First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987).
205. 928 F. Supp. 1009, 1013-14 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
206. See id. at 1014.
207. 143 F.3d at 802.
208. Id. at 806.
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